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Abstract This paper compares the inherent notions of justice in four different approaches to
flood risk management in Europe. As protection against flood risks becomes increasingly
difficult, dilemmas of justice emerge: some benefits from flood protection measures whereas
others loose. Decisions on whom to protect differentiate between upstream and downstream
or left and right side of a river. This raises a central but barely discussed conflict: what (or
rather who) should be protected against inundations? This question deals in essence with
justice. Justice concerns questions over fairness in the allocation of resources, capital and
wealth across different members of society. There are different and contradicting concepts of
justice, which differ in interpretations of fair resource allocation and distributions. ‘What’s
the right thing to protect’ is thus a question of concepts of justice. This contribution is not an
attempt to answer this fundamental question, but it offers a debate on how different concepts
of justice provide different answers. These answers will then be related to flood risk man-
agement approaches in England, the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria.
Keywords Flood risk management  Policy  Property rights  Justice  Allocation 
Distribution
1 Introduction: what should be protected?
Protection against flood risks is becoming increasingly difficult. Not only is the likelihood
of floods increasing (IPCC 2012), but, due to continuing settlement and the resulting higher
degree of vulnerability in floodplains, it becomes more and more difficult to protect all
& Thomas Thaler
thomas.thaler@boku.ac.at
1 Flood Hazard Research Centre, Middlesex University, London, UK
2 Institute of Mountain Risk Engineering, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences,
Vienna, Austria
3 Urban and Regional Research Centre Utrecht (URU), Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
123
Nat Hazards (2016) 83:129–147
DOI 10.1007/s11069-016-2305-1
properties along a river with the same standard—for economic and also for hydrological
reasons (Fuchs 2009; Fuchs et al. 2015). This goes beyond the question of where to locate
dikes and how high they need to be.
Flood protection measures—especially but not only dikes—influence property values,
because, with their establishment, the land becomes more profitable for uses that would not
have been possible without high design level (Tempels and Hartmann 2014; Hartmann and
Spit 2015). Is such value increase just a windfall gain for landowners? Barraque´ explains
that providing flood protection means socially reinterpreting floods: they are no longer a
force majeure—an act of God—but instead an issue of the welfare state (Barraque´ 2014).
Several questions can arise in response to this: Should a commercial area be inundated
more often than a residential area, or vice versa? What is the right level of protection for
cultural heritage buildings or other public buildings? Also financing flood risk management
brings with it the following issues: How should flood protection affect (tax)payers who do
not live in risk areas (intragenerational generation). How will policy instruments of
adaptation and mitigation strategies affect future generations (intergenerational generation)
(Walker 2009; McKinnon 2009; Moellendorf 2009; Neal et al. 2014). These issues of
justice are barely discussed in the scholarly debate on flood risk management (Doorn
2015). Therefore, key questions surrounding those problems include the following: What
justifies the protection of a particular piece of land? Whose land should be protected?
Should flood risk management protect the upstream and sacrifice the downstream, or vice
versa? Who—or rather what—should be protected best? These questions are recognised by
recent policy, although they are not expressed in such sharp terms.
The European Floods Directive (EC 2007) requires member states of the European Union
to develop flood risk management plans. These plans must be in effect by 2015 and set
‘appropriate objectives for the management of flood risk and [reduce] potential adverse
consequences of flooding for human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic
activity’ (EC 2007). The directive requires that different scenarios be taken into considera-
tion. This means that spatial planners, rather than considering one line of defence, must
integrate various lines—this change moves the emphasis from security towards risk (Hart-
mann and Ju¨pner 2014; Thaler 2014). This has crucial consequences for the allocation of land
use since it balances flood risk on a much more differentiated level, raising questions such as
whether a commercial area might be inundated more often than a residential area or what
might be the right level of protection for cultural heritage (Hartmann and Ju¨pner 2013).
Different countries have found different answers to these questions about allocation princi-
ples and processes and the distribution of costs and liabilities. These answers are not always
connected to the geological or geomorphological conditions (Mazzorana et al. 2012). One
could argue that the DutchWater Boards emerged as a result of their location in a Delta area,
whereas the North Rhine Westphalian Water Boards can be traced back to industrialisation.
However, the allocation and distribution principles are not derived from environmental
condition per se; rather they are a social construction. Discussion and implications of justice
in flood risk management literature is scarce (Johnson et al. 2007; Doorn 2015). With this
paper, we aim to address this gap. We compare four European countries (Austria, Germany,
England and the Netherlands) in terms of their answers to these questions of flood risk
management. These four countries have been selected for this study because their approaches
cover a sizeable variety of different concepts of justice.
This paper is divided into twomain parts. The first part provides a short overview and analysis
of the existing literature, which provides the context for the development of an analytical con-
ceptual framework. The secondpart analyses and assesses empirical results. The empirical results
demonstrate the different uses of justices’ arrangement in flood risk management.
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2 Concepts of justice
Different schools of thought have produced different concepts of justice (Elster 1992; Mill
2010; Patrick 2014). At its most basic level, the type of justice discussed in this article
concerns questions of allocation and distribution of resources and, further, capital and
wealth across different members of society. Varying concepts of justice differ in their
interpretations of fair resource distribution (Varian 1975). In the discussion of justice and
flood protection, not only the actual allocation of flood protection measures is significant
(Campbell 2012; Neal et al. 2014), but also the way in which this allocation is achieved.
Justice also relates to the process by which a certain distribution is selected (procedural
justice) (Johnson et al. 2007; Walker and Burningham 2011; May and Morrow 2012;
Patrick 2014). However, justice in flood risk management demands more than just a fair
socio-economic distribution or recognition of cultural circumstances (Zwarteveen and
Boelens 2014); it has to consider geohydrological, climatological, and socio-technical
aspects as well as legal cultural regulations (Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014).
Important concepts of justice include utilitarianism, libertarianism and egalitarianism
(Hayek 1991; Rawls 2005; Mill 2010; Sen 2010). Each concept has implications for the
allocation principles and processes and for the distribution of costs and liabilities of flood
risk management. Therefore, in the following sections, we will briefly describe the basic
rationales of each of these three concepts.
2.1 Utilitarianism (maximise utility)
According to the concept of utilitarianism, developed by classical economists Mill and
Bentham, justice and equity are the sum of individual benefits. Utilitarianism tries to
understand how to maximise happiness (utility) in a society (Johnson et al. 2007; Mill
2010). In fact, the main focus is the benefit of each individual. The utilitarian concept of
utility involves two main outcomes: (1) pleasure (positive reaction) and (2) pain (negative
reaction). Between both concepts, there is a neutral (indifferent) outcome (Elster 1992). A
utilitarian policy discussion would ensure a maximal benefit to society, or in other words,
the ‘greatest benefit to the greatest number’ (Hunold and Young 1998, p. 84).
In flood risk management, utilitarianism leads to criteria that secure the greatest risk
reduction per unit of resource input. Flood risk management strategies are applied to those
areas within a country where the benefits offer the greatest gain to the society (Johnson
et al. 2007). In sum, the distribution principle is the aggregated utility function of indi-
vidual well-being, where the role of the state is to ensure individual freedom and indi-
vidualism (Mill 2010). A typical tool to assess what should be protected and what should
not is the cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
2.2 Libertarianism (individual responsibility)
The main principles of libertarian justice are free market principles, especially competition,
availability of full information, equilibrium in market process and freedom of individual
self-decision (economic freedom) (Hayek 1991; Johnson et al. 2007). According to Hayek
(1991), the key aspects are the availability of full information and pre-defined rules (e.g.,
compensation payments). The distribution principle relies on the freedom of choices and
the invisible hand of the market, whereas the role of the state is to define rules for
individual action (Ostrom 1986; North 1990). Rules are the basic instrument for regulating
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individual freedom and relationships within the society (Ostrom 1986). Rules can be seen
as ‘prescriptions commonly known and used by a set of participants to order repetitive,
interdependent relationships’ (Ostrom 1986, p. 5). Key objectives of rules are to define the
interaction with the objective of individual freedom (North 1990).
Libertarian flood risk management entails a limited influence of the public government on
flood risk management. It is organised by the market forces, which means that they facilitate
insurance schemes or provide information on flood hazards zones. Libertarianism promotes
non-governmental activities in adaptation instead of public flood risk management.
2.3 Egalitarianism (maximise rule and equality)
Main focus of egalitarian principle is on equal and fair distribution of goods, services, and
burdens between citizens (equally between all citizens). ‘Goods ought to be divided
equally among everybody. Even when there is no consensus that equality is inherently fair,
it is often the only focal point for the resolution of conflicts’ (Elster 1992, p. 70). The key
argument is to ensure the equal opportunity of each citizen in the policy process (proce-
dural justices). Main critiques are the aspect that different citizens need different resources
to achieve the same targets and objectives (Roemer 1987). Rawls (2005) posited justice as
a concept that is defined by society to ensure basic needs and equality in terms of rights and
duties (maximise rule). Based on this understanding, Rawls justifies inequalities ‘only
when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice’ (Rawls 2005, p. 4). He tolerates
injustices if unequal developments in the society increase the overall benefit (wealth) of the
society. If the outcome reflects injustice, individuals will not be punished or discriminated
against in another aspect (Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014). In sum, the Rawlsian concept of
justice focuses on the distribution of primary goods as a central precondition of equality
instead of the power relationship between the different actors and stakeholders in the
decision-making process (Johnson et al. 2007; Lu et al. 2014).
For flood risk management, egalitarianism posits that the distribution of flood risk
management strategies and implementations should be addressed to the most vulnerable
people and objectives, such as implementing flood storages in the upper part of the
catchment principle to protect downstream communities (Johnson et al. 2007; Thaler
2014). The key aim is to analyse the social capacity of individuals referring to flood risk
management events (Gardoni and Murphy 2009). The concept focuses on vulnerability
reduction and public-funded flood risk management strategies for communities who were
disadvantaged. Therefore, it requires that flood risk management strategies should target at
the most vulnerable people with the key objective of funding local self-help adaptation
strategies, since large-scale investments cannot justify local flood risk management
strategies. The key objective is to avoid favouring high-value assets and areas within the
country when selecting flood risk management strategies (Johnson et al. 2007).
3 Conceptual framework
To translate and analyse justice discourse within flood risk management, a heuristic-
analytical framework (Table 1) is used. In sum, the table compares the implications of the
three main justice principles for flood risk management. The actual measures of flood risk
management in the four countries will be compared based on the following questions:
• What are the allocation principles for flood protection measures?
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• How is the process for the allocation organised?
• How are measures financed?
• Who is liable (and pays) for damage incurred by flood events?
These questions will be evaluated according to the prevalent concept of justice in the
respective countries. To accomplish this, a qualitative assessment of the basic principles
and theories of justice must be applied.
4 Method
The research method applied in this paper focuses on qualitative research. The aim is to
adopt different theoretical concepts and methods, such as policy analysis as well as semi-
structured in-depth interviews. The key objective is to generate or to redefine theoretical
concepts and discussions and not to test theoretical concepts and ideas (Mabry 2009). For
this purpose, we analyse policy documents, laws and the literature of the four countries. As
a first step, all relevant data—like research papers, consultant reports, reports, statement
and acts from public authorities, press articles and online websites—must be gathered. This
analysis is not meant to represent all the details of the countries’ flood risk management
approaches and policies—such an analysis would be a Herculean task. Rather the aim of
this paper is to identify the underlying notions of justice behind the predominant instru-
ments of flood management in each of the four countries. The results will then be assessed
in comparison with and juxtaposition to each other. The analysis has been complemented
by semi-structured interviews and discussions with experts in the different countries. We
conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with representatives from national,
regional and local authorities.
5 Results
Due to the actual economic and financial crises as well as technical limitations, protection
against flood risks becomes increasingly difficult. Therefore, not all properties along a river
can be protected with the same standard. This raises a central yet barely discussed issue of
Table 1 Justice principles for flood risk management
Utilitarianism Libertarianism Egalitarianism
Allocation of
flood
protection
measures
Differentiated
protection
standards based
on CBA ratio
Local and individual
protection measures
Equal protection standards
for all
Process of
allocation
Expert-based
decision-making
Process of allocation is
based on a market system
Consensus on general
protection standards
Share of costs
for flood
protection
Public funding
based on
calculated fees
Private–private partnerships General public budget
(i.e., tax-financed)
Liability of
damage
Clear
responsibilities
and liabilities by
public authorities
No compensation from the public
authorities; facilitating market
mechanisms (insurance with
premiums depending on risk zones)
No specific liability; in the
case of a flood, the State
steps in and compensates
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justice in flood risk management, such as how to allocate flood protection measures (which
areas to protect best), and who should pay for these measures. In Table 2, the four national
flood risk management policies are compared in terms of the four criteria.
5.1 England
5.1.1 Allocation of flood protection measures
At the beginning of 2000, the New Labour government significantly redefined the flood
policy in England. They partly redesigned the funding scheme and introduced an inte-
grated-holistic view of flood risk management that also affected the allocation of flood
protection schemes (Defra 2005). In the 1990s, the national government introduced the
Table 2 Comparing results of justice in the national flood risk management policy
England Austria Germany Netherlands
Allocation of flood protection measures
National funding based on
cost-benefit analysis
(utilitarianism)
Exemption in deprived
areas: structural
measures for the most
vulnerable people
(egalitarianism)
Equal protection
standards (mostly
1:100) without further
prioritisation
(egalitarianism)
Equal protection standards
(mostly 1:100) without
further prioritisation
(egalitarianism)
Transition from an
egalitarian model
towards a more
utilitarian approach
(utilitarianism)
Differentiated
protection levels in
dike rings (up to
1:10.000)
(utilitarianism)
Process of allocation
Decision mainly based on
experts’ decision based
on cost-benefit analysis
(utilitarianism)
Decision mainly based
on experts’ decision
based on cost-benefit
analysis
(utilitarianism)
Decision mainly based on
experts’ decision based
on cost-benefit analysis
(utilitarianism)
Increasing centralisation
of decision-making
(utilitarianism)
Elected Water boards
(egalitarianism)
Share of costs for flood protection
General state budget with
individual contributions
of landowners and
tenants
(utilitarianism)
Exemption with
communities falling
under partnership
funding: state budget
and fee proportional to
benefit
(liberalism)
General state budget
with individual
contributions of
landowners and
tenants
(utilitarianism)
Local contributions
based on benefit
proportionality
(liberalism)
Mainly state-financed
flood risk management
policy with different
responsibilities for
different water bodies
(utilitarianism)
Change towards more
national and state
funding
(egalitarianism)
General state budget
with individual
contributions of
landowners and
tenants
(utilitarianism)
Possibility of private
insurance (state-funded),
because of no public
compensation
(utilitarianism)
Usually, the state
voluntarily
compensates with
focus on most
vulnerable people
(egalitarianism)
Usually, the state
voluntarily compensates
(egalitarianism)
Flooding in most places
insurable
(libertarianism)
Usually, the state
voluntarily
compensates (areas
within the dike
rings)
(egalitarianism)
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priority scoring system, in which the different flood risk management projects were ranked
based on their benefit-cost ratio. The objective of the priority scoring was to identify if the
project can be realised with the current national funds (to ensure the realisation of projects
with highest benefits) and with effective use of public money. In 2010, the national
government redesigned the allocation of flood protection measures by introducing the
Outcome of Measures (OM). The OM approach ranks the selection of flood risk man-
agement schemes based on four elements.1 A further change came with the introduction of
OM4, which focussed on requirements requested by the European Water Framework
Directive (WFD)—the renaturation of rivers. With the introduction of the coalition gov-
ernment in 2010, we observed the latest step in the English flood risk management funding
regime: the introduction of the partnership funding scheme in April 2011. The main reason
for the introduction was the fiscal squeeze and state budget deficit. However, the part-
nership funding initiative is still in an experimental stage and not fully implemented for the
whole country.
5.1.2 Procedural justices: process of allocation
The flood risk management system in England includes a wide range of different legis-
lations and stakeholders. Main stakeholders are the Department of Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs (Defra) and the Environment Agency (EA). Defra is responsible for the
definition of the policy directions in England. EA has the operational responsibility, such
as preliminary flood risk assessment, flood hazards and risk maps, realisation of flood
defence schemes, flood warning and floodplain development advice. Further, the Internal
Drainage Boards (IDB), Water industry and Highway Road Authorities are generally
responsible for the ordinary water courses or pre-defined areas. Nevertheless, the process
of allocation is mainly based on experts (strong top-down politics).
Within the introduction of the partnership funding scheme, also the politics of stake-
holder engagement in the politics of flood risk management changed. Partnership funding
encourages local actors to get actively involved in the decision process, which is a central
objective of the new funding regime to encourage local actors, stakeholders and citizens to
engage in flood risk management. In particular, a central objective is to encourage gov-
erning bodies at the local level to take over the responsibility from the national government
(Thaler and Priest 2014; Begg et al. 2015; Thaler and Levin-Keitel 2016).
5.1.3 Share of costs for flood protection measures
Within partnership funding, the government grants the possibility of executing flood
defence schemes, even if they do not match the necessary requirements for 100 % funding.
Today, approximately 75 % of the projects are fully funded by the national government;
the other 25 % need additional funding from other parties. The central government has
recognised the need for additional financial contributions from third parties (i.e., non-state
actors, EU or county councils). These additional funding sources permit the country to
realise more flood protection measures even if they do not match the necessary require-
ments for 100 % funding.
Partnership funding anticipates a stronger engagement of non-state actors, such as local
citizens, in the flood risk management discussion (Thaler and Priest 2014; Begg et al. 2015;
1 OM 1 (economic benefits), OM 2 (households at risk), OM 3 (deprived areas at risk) and OM 4
(biodiversity).
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Thaler and Levin-Keitel 2016). Local actors and stakeholders have gained an important
role in funding and in organising external contributions to close the financial gap for
implementing structural flood protection. In England, for example, the contribution from
third parties was approximately £13 million in the period from 2008 to 2011; approxi-
mately £10 million came from local authorities and approximately £3 million came from
private actors (Committee on Climate Change 2012).
5.1.4 Liability for damage
Flood insurance plays a central role in the English flood risk management system (Lamond
et al. 2009). In terms of compensation, landowners have no recourse for requesting
compensation from the national government. The policy has functioned on a voluntary
insurance system since 1961. The payment rates are based on policy agreements between
the national government and insurance companies: a gentleman’s agreement (Penning-
Rowsell et al. 2014). However, the outcome was that the government has sent a false sense
of security to the society with the consequence of encouraging the exposure within the
country (Crichton 2002; Tarlock 2012). Furthermore, a central policy makes insurance
coverage a prerequisite for obtaining a mortgage; this requirement has implications for
selling the property. The availability of coverage depends on the following:
• Properties (private householders or businesses) in areas with a design level of 1:75 or
less are available; the premium depends on the level of risk;
• Properties (private householders or businesses) in areas with a flood risk of 1:75 or
more were only covered if the national authorities planned new or improved design
level within 5 years.
5.2 Austria
5.2.1 Allocation of flood protection measures
The Austrian policy on flood risk management follows the ‘classical’ understanding of
Central Europe. Overall, the policy aims to provide the same protection level to all citizens
(1:100 design level). Therefore, the allocation of financing for flood protection measures
also follows this principle; no distinction is made between the actual risk levels (including
vulnerabilities); only the achievement of the design level is relevant (as in Germany)
(Krieger 2012). Nevertheless, we observed a change in the flood risk management policy.
Since the 1990s, the Austrian flood risk management has shifted slightly away from local
flood protection schemes to a more holistic catchment management ideal (upstream–
downstream cooperations). The aim is to establish flood storages in the upper part of
catchments to reduce vulnerability within the whole catchment instead of a local point
(Thaler 2014; Thaler et al. 2016). In particular, downstream communities, which are more
vulnerable within the catchment, benefit from this policy shift. This shift includes a ‘safety
transfer’ from the upstream to the downstream communities and a ‘money transfer’ from
the downstream to the upstream communities. The arrangements are defined based on a
voluntary approach, although the interaction is based on formalised (pre-defined) rules,
such as organisational structure, foundation, contract design, etc., as defined under the
Austrian Water Act from 1959 (Austrian Government 1959).
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5.2.2 Procedural justices: process of allocation
In terms of procedural distribution, the inter-local cooperation has been transferring more
responsibility and possibility to the local authorities, in contrast to the ‘classical’ man-
agement approach. Inter-local cooperation requires strong engagement of local authorities
in the flood risk management discussion, such as planning, managing, designing and
maintaining flood protection measures. Most of the inter-local cooperations demonstrate an
active role in the planning and the strategic implementation process of flood risk man-
agement. The outcome is a stronger bottom-up approach. Nevertheless, the key problem
within the inter-local cooperation approach is the power shift to a steering group that
manages the cooperation. From the different examples investigated, we found that usually
large communities are members of the steering group. The consequence is that small
members often have less power in the overall decision process (Thaler 2014; Thaler et al.
2016).
5.2.3 Share of costs for flood protection measures
The flood risk management funding is based on national income tax as well as nationally
guaranteed funding towards regional and local authorities. In general, the WLV (Austrian
Service for Torrent and Avalanche Control) and BWV (Federal Water Engineering
Administration) hold the responsibility for planning, designing and funding flood protec-
tion measures in Austria. The WLV is responsible for flood protection on the national
level, whereas the BWV is an institution on the federal state level under the directive of the
national level. Accordingly, two institutions at different at different spatial levels have the
operational responsibility for flood protection. Together, they share the costs of a large
financial contribution to flood protection measures (approximately 80 % of the total costs).
Section 6 of the law for subsidising water works (‘Wasserbautenfo¨rderungsgesetz’)
determines that the costs for flood risk management have to be shared among the national
WLV (around 40–50 %), state-level BWV (around 30–40 %) and local authorities and
interests groups (20 % of total costs), such as landowners, public or private companies.
According to the Austrian water law, partnership funding allows for sharing the local
contribution among the members of the cooperation (‘Wasserrechtsgesetz’). This includes
that the inter-local cooperation is paying the necessary partnership funding.
5.2.4 Liability for damage
The Austrian water law does not provide a general right for flood protection measures that
makes it possible for individual householders to claim a right for protection or security.
The consequences of this are that individual householders may be required to take pre-
cautionary measures. Nevertheless, the main barriers and challenges of this model are the
political systems that do not foresee an exclusion of flood protection. The Austrian policy
decision makers understand flood risk management as a public good, which needs to be
financed by general tax money (Holub and Fuchs 2009). However, if flood alleviation
structures are built, the maintenance of these structures is the responsibility of local
authorities. In terms of compensation, the different federal states have different rules
governing the level of compensation, administration processes and legal exemptions in
cases of social hardship (Holub and Fuchs 2009). However, the flood losses compensation
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scheme is based on public tax money and mainly excluded from property insurance
policies. In generally, the range of compensation is between 30 and 50 % of the total loss.
5.3 Germany
5.3.1 Allocation of flood protection measures
German flood protection is much entrenched in a design-level orientation. Germany aims
to provide the same protection level to all citizens (1:100 design level) (Krieger 2012).
This means that, except for the hinterland, the embankments of most rivers protect against
a centennial flood. This is a basic principle not only in German regional planning, where
the term originates, but it also has an impact on the distribution of tax incomes among the
states (Wierer and Stauske 2005).
The allocation of finances for flood protection measures also follows this principle.
Rather than the actual risk (including vulnerabilities), only the achievement of the design
level is relevant (Krieger 2012). This undifferentiated allocation of flood risk management
helps in understanding why, in Germany, a relatively large number of urban development
projects takes place close to rivers (Hartmann 2011a, b). No differentiation is made
between riparian and other areas (Kreibich et al. 2011). Nevertheless, the National Flood
Protection Program from 2014 changes this situation in some respects. As a consequence
of the flood events in 2013 in Eastern Germany and large parts of South Germany, flood
protection measures have been prioritised (LAWA 2014). Specific weak spots in flood
protection have been identified, and with a focus on critical national infrastructure, tech-
nical protection measures have been defined. Another criterion for prioritising measures in
the National Flood Protection Program is the benefit of a certain measure for a certain area,
taking into account the size of benefiting residential areas, commercial areas and the
number of inhabitants for an extreme event (LAWA 2014). This resembles the emergence
of a utilitarian approach to the allocation of flood protection measures in Germany (see also
Table 2).
5.3.2 Procedural justices: process of allocation
For structural flood protection measures such as dikes, dams or retention polders, the
Federal Water Act (WHG, Wasserhaushaltsgesetz) is the most important national law.
Beyond this, flood protection is in the responsibility of the each Federal State (in total 16
different legislations). Each state released water laws that regulate the responsibility for
flood risk management. An exception is the large rivers such as the Rhine, Elbe or Danube,
which belong to the federation because they are federal waterways [Federal Act for
Waterways (WaStrG), Section 1].
Section 40 WHG states that, in general, the owner of a water body is responsible for its
maintenance (Section 40 WHG). Structural flood protection measures fall under the
maintenance of water bodies (Section 39 and 67 WHG).
The states then divide the remaining water bodies into categories, called ‘orders’
(‘Gewa¨sserordnung’). For example, like most other federal water authorities, North Rhine-
Westphalia determined that water bodies of the first order belong to the state.2 Those are
usually the larger rivers in a state (Section 1 WaStrG and Section 4 of the water law of
North Rhine-Westphalia). For water bodies of the second order, North Rhine-Westphalia
2 If they do not belong to the system of federal waterways.
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determined that ownership is linked to the ownership of adjacent land (if the water body is
not real estate on its own). Other German states also define third-order water bodies as
municipal water bodies. So, for most water bodies, some public institution is the respon-
sible owner. Most states such as Saxony-Anhalt (Hartmann 2011c) or Saxony (Hartmann
and Albrecht 2014) assign public bodies to be responsible for flood risk management, and
only North Rhine-Westphalia has a particular system build on sophisticated water boards
(Johann and Leismann 2014). The National Flood Protection Program has considerable
impact on the federal organisation of flood protection, in that it aims at a stronger coor-
dination of flood protection measures from the national level. This is the first time that
flood risk management is attempted to be coordinated at the national level. Ultimately, it
can be said that there is a tendency towards centralising the decision-making on the
allocation of flood protection measures in Germany, triggered by recent flood events (see
also Table 2).
5.3.3 Share of costs for flood protection measures
However, usually a public body finances the majority of the costs of structural measures.
Section 40 WHG determines that the costs for flood protection measures can be shared
among landowners and others who profit from the measure in question (Knopp 2010). The
responsibility for flood risk management is assigned to the state level; hitherto, flood
protection schemes that exceed the regional scale could not have been implemented due
the central State funding (BMUB 2016). This led to insufficient realisation of upstream
retention measures.
The National Flood Protection Program explicatively addresses the conflict of interests
between upstream and downstream. The program wants to emphasise a principle of soli-
darity to finance measures in a catchment. Therefore, the national government set up a
special fund, where more than 300 million Euro are foreseen for implementing measures.
This fund is meant to compensate costs and benefits between upstream and downstream.
5.3.4 Liability for damage
Individual landowners cannot legally claim a right to a particular flood protection measure
(not even against the one-in-a-hundred-years flood) (Breuer 2006). Legal claims may be
made only if a governmental action was not proportional to the damages in question or in
cases of negligence (Reinhardt 2004). In constitutional terms, landowners take all the
benefits but also all the risks of landownership (Davy 2006).
There is no general entitlement to flood risk management, but once a dike has been
built, water management agencies are liable for the maintenance of that dike (Hartmann
2009). This has several effects: first, water managers have an interest in the maintenance of
dikes, which is positive for effectively defending against floods. But another effect is that
landowners can rely on water management agencies—there is no special need to take
action to realise precautionary measures.
In true practice, however, the state often intervenes in the case of disasters (Krieger
2012). For example, in 2002, a tax reform was postponed to alleviate the burden on flood
victims (Deutscher Bundestag 2002). However, the state is not formally liable for indi-
vidual damages (Reinhardt 2004).
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5.4 The Netherlands
5.4.1 Allocation of flood protection measures
In the Netherlands, water management has always been an essential issue in providing safe
living conditions for the people (Needham 2007; Kabat et al. 2009; Hartmann and Spit
2012). A big issue—triggered by the large storm surge in 1953—is, of course, coastal
flooding. But river floods also play an important role. In 1993, a major river flood event in
the Netherlands initiated a paradigm shift in flood risk management away from a purely
dike-dominated approach to comprehensive flood risk management (Hartmann 2012).
However, dikes still remain the most important element of the national flood risk man-
agement (Wesselink et al. 2007).
Different flood protection levels exist in the Netherlands. Whereas most parts of the
Randstad—the economic heart of the Netherlands, including the four big cities of Ams-
terdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht—are protected against flood events of
1:10,000, less densely settled parts of the Netherlands are protected against flooding that
occurs statistically once in 4000, 2000 or 1250 years (Kabat et al. 2009).
5.4.2 Procedural justices: process of allocation
For centuries, water boards have been essential institutions in the Netherlands (van der
Cammen et al. 2012). These are local authorities that have evolved as bottom-up initiatives
since the 13th century and are responsible for water control, including the maintenance of
dikes (van Steen and Pellenbarg 2004). Currently, 26 of those water boards exist based on
catchment-oriented boundaries (respectively dike rings). So, the administrative boundaries
follow the water bodies, which is an important feature for all decisions regarding the
allocation of protection measures. The water boards are composed of democratically
elected representatives of public and private stakeholders (Heer et al. 2004). Water boards
are considered to be the oldest democratic institutions in the Netherlands (Huisman 2002).
The power of representatives depends on the benefit they receive from their activities
(these benefits cover not only flood risk management but also water quality or quantitative
water management). The collaboration between public and private entities is a typical way
of organisation in the Netherlands (‘Poldermodel’) (Schreuder 2001). Besides the water
boards, the Dutch Directorate-General ‘Rijkswaterstaat’ is the most important and central
institution for water management in the Netherlands. It also builds on a long-lasting
tradition, and it centrally governs and initiates all water-related issues with ‘hegemony of
the state’ (Wiering and Crabbe´ 2006).
5.4.3 Share of costs for flood protection measures
Whereas water boards take care of local and regional flood protection measures, Rijk-
swaterstaat is responsible for national flood risk management. Rijkswaterstaat uses a
general budget assigned by the government (via taxes) (Huisman 2002). Water boards
cannot rely on subsidies from the national budget to pursue their tasks—they need to
refinance their activities; therefore, water boards can make use of their authority to collect
their own taxes (Kuks 2002; Rijkswaterstaat 2012).
As a result, tenants and landowners also pay a contribution to flood protection measures.
Their contribution is collected in different taxes. The two most important taxes are the
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inhabitant tax and the property tax. Every tenant of a living accommodation pays for flood
protection in the form of the inhabitant tax. In addition, landowners pay for flood risk
management via the property tax. The tax is calculated based on the surface area of the
individual property and the value of the buildings (appraised by the municipalities)
(Huisman 2002).
5.4.4 Liability for damage
One important framing condition with respect to liability for flood damages in the
Netherlands is that floods are, in general, not insurable. The whole Dutch system of flood
risk management builds on the ideology that flooding just may not happen. This means that
the options for private financial preventions are limited. Since 1995, it has been under
consideration that the liability for flood damages be attributed to water boards and
landowners (Kuks 2002).
6 Discussion
6.1 Allocation of flood protection measures
The English allocation of flood risk management policy includes a strong vein of utili-
tarianism—the maximisation of total benefits to society. One of the negative consequences
of this policy direction is generating a moral hazards within the society. The government
rewards moral hazards actions, because especially large urban developments (high number
of exposure) will get secured by structural defence schemes (Tarlock 2012). In general, the
selection of protection level is mainly based on the results from the benefit-cost ratio
(Johnson et al. 2007). This fits the Dutch approach of differentiated flood protection levels
for the Randstad and more rural areas. However, the English partnership funding policy
indicate a shift towards a liberalist approach, where people with adequate financial
resources are able to realise a protection scheme that benefits only them or a certain area
(Thaler and Priest 2014). On the other hand, the Austrian clearly follows an egalitarian
model within the allocation process in flood risk management. Influentially, the Austrian
policy tries to redistribute the resources in flood risk management in order to equalise the
distribution of investments (independently between rural or urban areas). The aim is to
provide an equal-similar security-approach between the different regions. Equality is
regarded here in the sense of Rawls idea of ‘equality of outcome’ (opposed to Friedman’s
‘equality of opportunity’) (Sandel 2007). Although the German system also fits this
egalitarian approach of equal protection standards, it seems to be in transition from an
egalitarian model towards a more utilitarian approach, initiated by the National Flood
Protection Program.
6.2 Procedural justices: process of allocation
The public administrations in the selected countries play the central role in flood risk
management policy (top-down approach). These organisations are the key actors in the
policy discussion and definition, where local stakeholders are mainly excluded from the
discussion and decision-making process. The main reasons for this are their technical
knowledge, their central role in funding and their permission power. Overall the local
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actors and stakeholder strategically depend on the national and regional authorities.
Nevertheless, some examples with high local capacity and existing of space of engagement
at regional or national level show a strong leadership at local level and bottom-up concepts
and ideas. In particular, local knowledge and experiences play a role in the planning and
implementation of flood risk management strategies. The local involvement in the dis-
cussion and decision process depends on the local capacity (capacity to act), such as
resources (knowledge, financial, time), interest, social and cultural capital (Kuhlicke et al.
2011; Thaler and Priest 2014; Thaler and Levin-Keitel 2016). It strongly depends on the
fact whether localities are able to ensure their interest and needs with national authorities.
The English flood risk management policy slightly opens the discussion process within
the introduction of the partnership funding scheme. The implications are that local
organisations have become more important in the English flood risk management policy. In
terms of justice, this notion of equality of opportunity of different stakeholders is an
important indicator for a more libertarian process. Dutch water management is organised
from the bottom up, and water boards, which are backed by a strong state institution, are
directly elected. This makes the Dutch system more egalitarian than the other models. In
Germany, as well as in Austria, allocation decisions are mainly based on cost-benefit
analysis (utilitarianism). The National Flood Protection Program in Germany leads to an
increasing centralisation of decision-making, strengthening this utilitarian approach.
6.2.1 Share of costs for flood protection measures
The English system in the allocation of flood risk management is mainly based on the
benefit-cost ratio (strong utilitarianism approach; see also Johnson et al. 2007). However,
within the introduction of the outcome of measure system, the government begins to give a
greater weight to deprived areas across the country, where the central government con-
sidered these areas as more worthy of receiving funds for flood management measures
(shift towards a more egalitarianism thinking). Consequently, the national support were
higher for deprived households, where they are least likely to be insured, less able to afford
local protection measures and least likely to be able to recover from a flood event without
additional welfare support. Therefore, a key change was that the aspects of justice played
into the final decision process for the first time. Furthermore, the government excluded
private businesses and infrastructure operators in the calculation—they had to manage their
risk independently. Here, we observed a strong shift from an economic priority towards
focusing on people. The latest step, within the introduction of the partnership funding,
focuses on the method developed by the New Labour government but allows ‘third parties’
(non-state stakeholders or local authorities) to contribute to the flood risk management
budget (depending on their income). This shift towards a beneficiary pays principle system
clearly fits within the libertarian model (Watkinson et al. 2007). Germany and Austria
probably lie on the other side of the spectrum, with a mainly state-financed flood risk
management policy, although in many of the federal states, variations of state financing
apply (whereas the National Flood Protection Program centralises the financing). It is
worth mentioning that in Germany and the Netherlands a difference is made between
national, regional and sometimes local water ways. Different institutions are responsible
for the measures then. This nested hierarchy points towards a utilitarian system. However,
as indicated earlier, the German system seems to change at the moment towards a more
egalitarian scheme, because the National Flood Protection Program clearly states the goal
of establishing a principle of solidarity among upstream and downstream.
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6.3 Liability for damage
The English liability for damage system includes a strong focus on private actors (insur-
ance companies). Private insurance system clearly fits within the utilitarian model (Johnson
et al. 2007), where the industry is focussing to ensure the greatest return to the share-
holders. Further, the insurance system cannot fit to the egalitarianism approach, because
usually the most vulnerable people at high risk are most likely uninsured (Lamond et al.
2009; Holub and Fuchs 2009; Penning-Rowsell et al. 2014). The interconnection between
the private insurance system and the public policy of flood risk management can be
understood as a dialectical interaction, where the private interests of householders and
businesses—affordable insurance bills and access to mortgage—have become part of the
general interests. In contrast in Austria where flood insurance has no significant influence
in flood risk management policy, because the flood losses compensation scheme is based
on public tax and mainly excluded from property insurance policies (Holub and Fuchs
2009). Further, the Austrian policy foresees a greater focus on the most social vulnerable
people within the country. In particular, householders with low income get a higher support
from the government. This clearly fits within the egalitarianism concept (Rawls 2005;
Johnson et al. 2007; Sen 2010). Although there is no formal liability of the state for flood
damages, the state usually steps into help victims of flood events. This fits an egalitarian
approach. However, in addition to this, flooding in Germany is in almost all places
insurable (within a scheme that includes also other natural hazards). In the Netherlands, in
contrast, flooding is non-insurable. Also liability is barely discussed, because flooding is
considered not an option at all. Most activities focus on technical flood protection measures
to keep the water out—although this approach is very slowly changing due to the inter-
national debate on flood risk management. In recent election campaigns for the water
boards, flooding of dike rings have been an issue. So, this issue is getting some awareness
in the Netherlands.
7 Conclusion
Our study’s results have yielded new insights regarding concepts of justice in the politics
of flood risk management. In the four compared study sites, different notions of justice are
applied to flood risk management. This paper compares the concept of justice reflected in
four European countries’ (Austria, Germany, England and the Netherlands) different
approaches to flood risk management. In general, we can distinguish between an Anglo-
Saxon justice approach (with a greater focus on Utilitarianism) and a continental European
understanding of justice (with an emphasis on social justice). The greatest differences
between England and continental Europe can be observed regarding issues of liability for
damages and the allocation of flood risk management. Here, the English government
follows a strongly technical decision-making process. The differences are mainly based on
a historical development in the social contract between state and society (Johnson et al.
2007; Adger et al. 2013; Thaler and Priest 2014; Begg et al. 2015). However, each country
has its own characteristic concept of justice. For example, Austrian flood risk management
policy focuses on catchment-wide management as an ideal policy instrument to implement
the European Floods Directive. In contrast, in the Netherlands and in Germany, the
Government concentrates more on locally based flood risk management strategies (see also
Hartmann 2011a, b and Thaler 2014). Moreover, the European Union has released a
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Directive calling for a more convergent approach all over Europe. This creates tensions
because of the practical relevance of implementing the directive, notably the European
Flood Risk Management Plans (Tempels and Hartmann 2014).
The allocation of flood protection measures differs in the four countries. In terms of
justice, it is relevant to consider what is protected by the different approaches. Whereas
flood protection measures in Germany are not an obligatory responsibility of the state, in
reality, the allocation of flood protection measures follows the ideal of Rawls. No matter
one’s position in society or in terms of flood risk, everyone is protected equally. This
concept is also applied in Austria, complemented by a CBA. The main consequence of the
introduction of partnership funding in England is a strong involvement of local citizens in
the planning and decision-making practices. On the one hand, we observed a ‘privatisation’
of responsibility, moving to non-state actors and stakeholders. On the other hand, the
Austrian and German flood risk management systems include strong top-down decision-
making practices, where experts from public administration or politicians design new flood
risk management plans. This relationship is also characterised by a technocratic nature in
these two countries, since civil servants have the main responsibility and workload in this
relationship (Perkmann 2007). Meanwhile, the Dutch system incorporates more democratic
elements (water boards are democratically elected bodies). In general, public administra-
tion is responsible for flood risk management; therefore, it is part of the executive estate of
the state. This stands in contrast to the English flood risk management system, where,
based on the Water Act from 1989 (UK Legislation 1989), private water companies are
responsible for the urban drainage (Thaler and Priest 2014). An exception is the Dutch
system of water boards, where water management authorities are composed of represen-
tatives of municipalities and industry (Hartmann and Spit 2012).
We conclude that no country has one clear-cut concept of justice; each of them
incorporates elements from all concepts of justice. There also is not one prevailing
approach to the allocation of flood protection measures, to the processes for allocation, the
distribution of costs or the liability issues. This is important not only for the international
collaboration in common catchments (which is least relevant for England), but also for the
implementation of supranational legislation, notably European directives, such as EU
Floods Directive or Water Framework Directive.
Acknowledgments Open access funding provided by University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences
Vienna (BOKU). The research leading to these results has partly funding from the JPI-Climate project
TRANS-ADAPT funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy (BMWFW),
the French National Research Agency (ANR), the Ireland Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and Middlesex University, London.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Adger WN, Quinn T, Lorenzoni I, Murphy C, Sweeney J (2013) Changing social contracts in climate-
change adaptation. Nat Climate Change 3:330–333. doi:10.1038/nclimate1751
Austrian Government (1959) Wasserrechtsgesetz 1959 (WRG 1959) idF BGBI I Nr 14 2011, Vienna
Barraque´ B (2014) The common property issue in flood control through land use in France. J Flood Risk
Manag. doi:10.1111/jfr3.12092
144 Nat Hazards (2016) 83:129–147
123
Begg C, Walker G, Kuhlicke C (2015) Localism and flood risk management in England: the creation of new
inequalities. Environ Plan C. doi:10.1068/c12216
BMUB (2016) Fragen und Antworten zum Nationalen Hochwasserschutzprogramm. Retrieved from http://
www.bmub.bund.de/themen/wasser-abfall-boden/binnengewaesser/hochwasser/hochwasserschutzprog
ramm/. Accessed 08 Mar 2016
Breuer R (2006) Die neuen wasserrechtlichen Instrumente des Hochwasserschutzgesetzes vom 3.5.2005.
Nat Recht 28(10):614–623
Campbell T (2012) Theories of justice. Ashgate, Farnham
Committee on Climate Change (2012) Climate change—is the UK preparing for flooding and water scar-
city? Retrieved from www.preventionweb.net. Accessed 26 Nov 2015
Crichton D (2002) UK and global insurance responses to flood hazard. Water Int 27(1):119–131. doi:10.
1080/02508060208686984
Davy B (2006) Innovationspotentiale fu¨r Fla¨chenentwicklung in schrumpfenden Sta¨dten. Retrieved from
www.iba-stadtumbau.de. Accessed 26 Nov 2015
Department for Environment (Defra) (2005) Making space for water: taking forward a new government
strategy for flood and coastal erosion risk management in England. Retrieved from http://archive.defra.
gov.uk. Accessed 26 Nov 2015
Deutscher Bundestag (2002) Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen SPD und BU¨NDNIS 90/DIE GRU¨NEN. Entwurf
eines Gesetzes zur A¨nderung steuerrechtlicher Vorschriften und zur Errichtung eines Fonds ‘Auf-
bauhilfe’ (Flutopfersolidarita¨tsgesetz). Drucksache 14/9894. Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag
Doorn N (2015) The blind spot in risk ethics: managing natural hazards. Risk Anal 35(3):354–360. doi:10.
1111/risa.12293
Elster J (1992) Local justice: how institutions allocate scarce goods and necessary burdens. Russell Sage
Foundation, New York
European Floods Directive (EC) (2007) On the assessment and management of flood risks. 23 October 2007.
Off J Eur Union, L 288
Fuchs S (2009) Susceptibility versus resilience to mountain hazards in Austria – paradigms of vulnerability
revisited. Nat Hazards Earth Syst Sci 9(2):337–352. doi:10.5194/nhess-9-337-2009
Fuchs S, Keiler M, Zischg A (2015) A spatiotemporal multi-hazard exposure assessment based on property
data. Natural Hazards Earth Syst Sci 15(9):2127–2142. doi:10.5194/nhess-15-2127-2015
Gardoni P, Murphy C (2009) Capabilities-based approach to measuring the societal impacts of natural and
man-made hazards in risk analysis. Nat Hazards Rev 10(2):29–37
Hartmann T (2009) Clumsy floodplains and the law: towards a responsive land policy for extreme floods.
Built Environ 35(4):531–544
Hartmann T (2011a) Clumsy floodplains: responsive land policy for extreme floods. Ashgate, Farnham
Hartmann T (2011b) Contesting land policies for space for rivers: rational, viable, and clumsy floodplain
management. J Flood Risk Manag 4(3):165–175. doi:10.1111/j.1753-318X.2011.01101.x
Hartmann T (2011c) Den Flu¨ssen mehr Raum geben: umsetzungsrestriktionen in Recht und Praxis.
Raumforsch Raumordn 69(4):257–268
Hartmann T (2012) Land policy for German rivers: making space for the rivers. In: Warner JF, van Buuren
A, Edelenbos J (eds) Making space for the river: governance experiences with multifunctional river
planning in the US and Europe. IWA Publishing, London, pp 121–133
Hartmann T, Albrecht J (2014) From flood protection to flood risk management: condition-based and
performance-based regulations in German water law. J Environ Law 26(2):243–268. doi:10.1093/jel/
equ015
Hartmann T, Ju¨pner R (2013) Der Hochwasserrisikomanagementplan: Herausforderung fu¨r Wasser-
wirtschaft und Raumplanung. In Stamm J, Graw K-U (eds) Wasserbaukolloquium 2013. Technischer
und organisatorischer Hochwasserschutz (pp 183–192). Dresden: Dresdner Wasserbauliche
Mitteilungen
Hartmann T, Ju¨pner R (2014) The flood risk management plan—an essential step towards the institution-
alization of a paradigm shift. Int J Water Gov 2(1):107–118. doi:10.7564/13-IJWG5
Hartmann T, Spit T (2012) Managing riverside property: spatial water management in Germany from a
Dutch perspective. In: Hartmann T, Needham B (eds) Planning by law and property rights reconsid-
ered. Ashgate, Farnham, pp 97–114
Hartmann T, Spit T (2015) Implementing the European flood risk management plan. J Environ Plan Manag.
doi:10.1080/09640568.2015.1012581
Hayek FA (1991) The road to serfdom. Routledge, London
Heer JD, Nijwening S, de Vuyst S, Rijswick M, van Smit T, Groenendijk J (2004) Towards integrated water
legislation in the Netherlands: lessons from other countries. Retrieved from www.uu.nl/faculty/leg.
Accessed 26 Nov 2015
Nat Hazards (2016) 83:129–147 145
123
Holub M, Fuchs S (2009) Mitigating mountain hazards in Austria: legislation, risk transfer, and awareness
building. Nat Hazards Earth Syst Sci 9(2):523–537. doi:10.5194/nhess-9-523-2009
Huisman P (2002) How The Netherlands finance public water management. European Water Management.
Retrieved from www.ewa-online.eu. Accessed 26 Nov 2015
Hunold C, Young IM (1998) Justice, democracy, and hazardous siting. Polit Stud 46(1):82–95. doi:10.1111/
1467-9248.00131
IPCC (2012) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation. A
special report of working groups I and II of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Johann G, Leismann M (2014) How to realise flood risk management plans efficiently in an urban area: the
Seseke project. J Flood Risk Manag. doi:10.1111/jfr3.12075
Johnson CL, Penning-Rowsell E, Parker D (2007) Natural and imposed injustices: the challenges in
implementing ‘fair’ flood risk management policy in England. Geograph J 173(4):374–390. doi:10.
1111/j.1475-4959.2007.00256.x
Kabat P, Fresco LO, Stive MJF, Veerman CP, van Alphen JSLJ, Parmet BWAH et al (2009) Dutch coasts in
transition. Nat Geosci 2(7):450–452. doi:10.1038/ngeo572
Knopp G-M (2010) Das neue Wasserhaushaltsrecht: WHG-Novelle 2010. Beck, Mu¨nchen
Kreibich H, Seifert I, Thieken AH, Lindquist E, Wagner K, Merz B (2011) Recent changes in flood
preparedness of private households and businesses in Germany. Reg Environ Change 11(1):59–71.
doi:10.1007/s10113-010-0119-3
Krieger K (2012) Norms, structures, procedures and variety in risk-based governance: the case of flood
management in Germany and England. Jerus Papers Regul Gov 2012(47):1–33
Kuhlicke C, Steinfuehrer A, Begg C, Bianchizza C, Bruendl M, Buchecker M, De Marchi B, Di Masso
Tarditti M, Hoeppner C, Komac B, Lemkow L, Luther J, McCarthy SS, Pellizzoni L, Renn O, Scolobig
A, Supramaniam M, Tapsell S, Wachinger G, Walker G, Whittle R, Zorn M, Faulkner H (2011)
Perspectives on social capacity building for natural hazards: outlining an emerging field of research
and practice in Europe. Environ Policy 14:804–814. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.05.001
Kuks S (2002) The evolution of the national water regime in The Netherlands. Retrieved from www.
euwareness.nl. Accessed 26 Nov 2015
Lamond JE, Proverbs DG, Hammond FN (2009) Accessibility of flood risk insurance in the UK: confusion,
competition and complacency. J Risk Res 12(6):825–841. doi:10.1080/13669870902768614
LAWA (2014) Zusammenfassende Analyse der Ergebnisse der vom Hochwasser 2013 betroffenen
Flussgebietsgemeinschaften beschlossen auf der 147. LAWA-VV am 27./28. Ma¨rz 2014 in Kiel, Kiel
Legislation UK (1989) Water Act 1989. UK Parliament, London
Lu F, Ocampo-Raeder C, Crow B (2014) Equitable water governance: future directions in the understanding
and analysis of water inequities in the global South. Water Int 39(2):129–142. doi:10.1080/02508060.
2014/896540
Mabry L (2009) Case study in social research. In: Alasuutari P, Bickman L, Brannen J (eds) The SAGE
handbook of social research methods. SAGE, London, pp 214–227
May L, Morrow P (2012) Procedural justice. The library of essays on justice. Ashgate, Farnham
Mazzorana B, Levaggi L, Keiler M, Fuchs S (2012) Towards dynamics in flood risk assessment. Nat
Hazards Earth Syst Sci 12(11):3571–3587. doi:10.5194/nhess-12-3571-2012
McKinnon C (2009) Runaway climate change: a justice-based case for precautions. J Soc Philos
40(2):187–203. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2009.01446.x
Mill JS (2010) Utilitarianism, liberty and representative government. Wildside Press, Milton Keynes
Moellendorf D (2009) Justice and the assignment of the intergenerational costs of climate change. J Soc
Philos 40(2):204–224. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2009.01447.x
Neal MJ, Lukasiewicz A, Syme GJ (2014) Why justice matters in water governance: some ideas for a ‘water
justice framework’. Water Policy 16:1–18. doi:10.2166/wp.2014.109
Needham B (2007) Dutch land use planning: planning and managing land use in the Netherlands, the
principles and the practice. SDU, The Hague
North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. The political economy of
institutions and decisions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Ostrom E (1986) An agenda for the study of institutions. Public Choice 48(1):3–25
Patrick MJ (2014) The cycles and spirals of justice in water-allocation decision making. Water Int
39(1):63–80. doi:10.1080/02508060.2013.863646
Penning-Rowsell EC, Priest S, Johnson C (2014) The evolution of UK flood insurance: incremental change
over six decades. Int J Water Resour Dev 89(4):694–713. doi:10.1080/07900627.2014.903166
Perkmann M (2007) Construction of new territorial scales: a framework and case study of the EUREGIO
cross-border region. Reg Stud 41(2):253–266. doi:10.1080/00343400600990517
146 Nat Hazards (2016) 83:129–147
123
Rawls J (2005) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Reinhardt M (2004) Hochwasserschutz zwischen Enteignungsentscha¨digung und Amtshaftung. Nat Recht
26(7):420–429
Rijkswaterstaat (2012) Flood risk and water management in The Netherlands: A 2012 update. Retrieved
from http://wetten.overheid.nl. Accessed 26 Nov 2015
Roemer JE (1987) Egalitarianism, responsibility and information. Econ and Philos 3(2):215–244. doi:10.
1017/S026626710000290X
Sandel MJ (2007) Justice: a reader. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Schreuder Y (2001) The polder model in Dutch economic and environmental planning. Bull Sci Technol
Soc 21(4):237–245. doi:10.1177/027046760102100401
Sen A (2010) The idea of justice. Penguin, London
Tarlock DA (2012) Takings, water rights, and climate change. 36 Vt. L. Rev. 731. http://scholarship.
kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1675&context=fac_schol. Accessed 02 Mar 2016
Tempels B, Hartmann T (2014) A co-evolving frontier between land and water: dilemmas of flexibility
versus robustness in flood risk management. Water Int 39(6):872–883. doi:10.1080/02508060.2014.
958797
Thaler T (2014) Developing partnership approaches for flood risk management: implementation of inter-
local co-operations in Austria. Water Int 39(7):1018–1029. doi:10.1080/02508060.2014.992720
Thaler T, Levin-Keitel M (2016) Multi-level stakeholder engagement in flood risk management – a question
of roles and power: lessons from England. Environ Sci Policy 55(1):292–301. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.
2015.04.007
Thaler T, Priest S (2014) Partnership funding in flood risk management: new localism debate and policy in
England. Area 46(4):418–425. doi:10.1111/area.12135
Thaler T, Priest S, Fuchs S (2016) Evolving interregional co-operation in flood risk management: distances
and types of partnership approaches in Austria. Reg Environ Change 16(3):841–853. doi:10.1007/
s10113-015-0796-z
van der Cammen H, Klerk LAD, Dekker G, Witsen PP, O’Loughlin M (2012) The selfmade land: culture
and evolution of urban and regional planning in The Netherlands. Spectrum, Houten
van Steen PJ, Pellenbarg PH (2004) Water management challenges in the Netherlands. Tijdschr Econ Soc
Geogr 95(5):590–598
Varian HR (1975) Distributive justice, welfare economics, and the theory of fairness. Philos Public Aff
4(3):223–247
Walker G (2009) Beyond distribution and proximity: exploring the multiple spatialities of environmental
justice. Antipode 41(4):614–636. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00691.x
Walker G, Burningham K (2011) Flood risk, vulnerability and environmental justice: evidence and eval-
uation of inequality in a UK context. Crit Soc Policy 31(2):216–240. doi:10.1177/0261018310396149
Watkinson AR, Cornell SE, Tinch R (2007) Sustainability of flood risk management responses. In: Thorne
CR, Evans EP, Penning-Rowsell E (eds) Future flooding and coastal erosion risks. Thomas Telford,
London, pp 461–474
Wesselink A, Bijker WE, de Vriend HJ, Krol MS (2007) Dutch dealings with the delta. Nat Culture
2(2):188–209
Wierer E, Stauske J-C (2005) Gleichwertige Lebensverha¨ltnisse. Retrieved from http://www.landtag.nrw.de.
Accessed 26 Nov 2015
Wiering M, Crabbe´ A (2006) The institutional dynamics of water management in the low countries. In: Arts
B, Leroy P (eds) Institutional dynamics in environmental governance. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 93–114
Zwarteveen MZ, Boelens R (2014) Defining, researching and struggling for water justice: some conceptual
building blocks for research and action. Water Int 39(2):143–158. doi:10.1080/02508060.2014.891168
Nat Hazards (2016) 83:129–147 147
123
